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Empirical Research Paper 
Governance in the Australian Superannuation Industry 
ABSTRACT: In the Superannuation/Pension industry ordinary investors entrust their 
retirement savings to the trustees of the superannuation plan. Investors rely on the 
trustees to ensure ethical business and risk management practices are implemented to 
protect their retirement savings. Governance practices ensure the monitoring of ethical 
risk management (Drennan, 2004). The Australian superannuation industry presents a 
unique scenario. Legislation requires employers to contribute a minimum of 9% of the 
employees wage to retirement savings. However, there are no legislated governance 
standards, although there are standards of recommended governance practices. In this 
paper, we examine the level of voluntary adoption of governance practices by the trustees 
of Australian public sector and industry superannuation funds. We also assess whether 
superannuation governance practices are associated with performance and 
volatility/riskiness of returns.  Survey results show that the majority of superannuation 
plans adopt recommended governance practices supporting the concept of ethical 
management of the member’s retirement savings. The examination of governance 
principles that impact returns and risk show that board size and regular review of 
conflicts are positively associated with return. Superannuation plans with higher volatility 
in returns meet more frequently.   
KEY WORDS: board of trustees, superannuation governance, fund performance. 
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Introduction 
The Australian system of pension plans (known as “superannuation”) presents a unique 
(two-tiered) agency setting in which the impact of governance practices can be analysed 
to produce important new insights relevant to the broad concern of business ethics. 
Adopting this setting, the core objectives of our paper are twofold. First, we seek to 
determine the extent to which trustees of superannuation plans voluntarily implement 
governance practices. Second, we assess how the implementation of governance practices 
impact the performance and overall risk of the superannuation plan.  
The purpose of a superannuation plan is similar to a pension plan, that is, it 
provides financial benefits to contributors during retirement. The necessary financial 
resources are achieved by way of managed investment of contributions and subsequent 
distribution (Australian Government, 2008). Statistics show that in 10 years, 
superannuation assets in Australia increased from $245 billion to $912 billion and 
represents a value equal to 98.8% of Australia’s nominal Gross Domestic Product as at 
December 31, 2006 (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2007).1 
Superannuation plans offer a managed portfolio service with various risk and return 
options and, like corporations, are characterised by a separation of ownership and control.  
Contributors to a superannuation plan rely on the trustees to safeguard their 
assets. Trustees, in fulfilling their management role, must exercise some level of 
professional, ethical and moral management of the member’s retirement savings. In the 
absence of industry or legislative controls to the protect contributors interests, there are 
‘agency problems’ faced by contributors of superannuation plans in Australia. The 
contributors are the investors, principals and beneficiaries of the plan. They do not have 
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control over how the plan is structured and managed or how and where their 
contributions are invested. Instead, contributors engage (through contract) a trustee to 
manage the plan’s assets. Therefore, the trustee becomes the legal owner of the assets 
acquired using the moneys invested by the contributors. The contributors require that the 
trustee is capable of making good investment decisions and acts in their best interest. 
Contributors therefore depend on legislation that bind trustees to honour the fiduciary 
duty that, by law, is owed to them (Drew & Stanford, 2003a).  
In yet another dimension, the contributor-trustee relationship becomes further 
complicated because trustees engage (through another contract to which the contributor is 
not a party) a portfolio manager to manage the plan’s assets. Hence, in superannuation 
plans two agency relationships are created through contractual agreements that co-exist. 
The first agency relationship is between the contributor to the superannuation plan (who 
is also the eventual beneficiary) and the trustee. The second agency relationship is 
between the trustee, who is the legal owner of the plan’s assets and the portfolio manager 
who makes investment decisions for the superannuation plan (Hallahan, Benson, Faff, 
2005). The contributor relies on the capability and integrity of the agent (the trustee), as 
well as the trustee’s agent (the portfolio manager) to protect their investment. The costs 
of monitoring the activities of both agents are born by the contributors (Drew & Stanford, 
2003). Drew and Stanford (2003) suggest that the agency issues in superannuation plans 
may result in lower returns, higher costs and the scope for unethical behaviour including 
mismanagement and fraud.  Governance controls have the potential to improve 
accountability and decrease agency costs.  
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There are ethical issues surrounding the trend toward the increasing size and power 
of superannuation plans, including the moral obligation to serve their beneficiaries' 
interests (Ryan and Dennis, 2003).2  Clark and Urwin (2008) suggest that good 
governance by trustees makes a significant incremental difference to value creation of 
pension plans and that the price of poor performance (governance) of these plans is high 
as it influences the welfare of many citizens.  While an ethical tone at the top of 
superannuation plan may not be sufficient to ensure effective governance, it is at least a 
necessary condition. 
There are no legislated governance requirements applicable to Australian 
superannuation plans; however, the Association of Super Funds of Australia Limited 
(ASFA) publishes best practice guidelines for the governance of superannuation plans. 
The aim of the guidelines is to assist superannuation plan trustees implement governance 
policies and practices. ASFA guidelines suggest that assessing superannuation 
governance will protect the plan from accusations of double standards and provide a solid 
base for the operation and development of the plan.  
As stated at the outset, our work documents the extent of voluntary governance 
behavior in superannuation plans and the impact of such on performance and risk. Our 
key empirical objective is to determine if governance principles have a positive impact of 
superannuation performance and a negative impact on the volatility of plan returns. As 
such, this research provides relevant information to plan members in their assessment of 
portfolio management practices and investment outcomes. Further, guidance is provided 
to standard setters who require information on governance practices in developing 
superannuation reforms.  Drennan (2004) suggests that a combination of legislation, 
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regulation, effective risk management and appropriate sanctions is needed to prevent the 
unethical behaviour which was endemic in recent corporate scandals. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background on the superannuation industry and includes a review of the literature 
relevant to agency costs and the relation between governance and investment outcomes. 
The key elements of fund governance are also identified Section 3 outlines the data and 
research methods. Results are presented in Section 4 and a conclusion is provided in 
Section 5. 
 
Background and literature review 
Structure of the Industry 
The Superannuation industry is governed principally by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA). APRA classifies superannuation plans into five major 
groups namely; retail, corporate, industry, public sector and other small plans. Retail 
plans are operated for profit, whereas corporate, industry and public sector plans are non-
profit organisations offering returns only to the members. Other types of plans are 
smaller, such as, Self Managed Superannuation Funds, Retirement Savings Accounts and 
Balances of Statutory Funds (APRA, 2005).  
The focus of this paper is on industry and public sector plans.3 Industry plans 
appeal to a large number of usually unrelated employers across a particular industry and 
often established under an agreement between parties to an industrial award. Since the 
implementation of the Choice legislation in 2005,4 many industry plans have become 
public offer plans. This status allows the plans to retain the investments of members who 
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may leave the industry and enables the plan to attract investors outside the industry. 
Public sector plans are sponsored by a government agency or business that is majority 
government owned. Table 1, shows Australian Superannuation plans in terms of numbers 
and dollars invested for each type of plan as at June 2006. Panels A and B, display the 
number of plans and the number of members per entity in each of the key classifications. 
Panel C exhibits the amount invested by each of these plans. It is interesting to note that, 
although industry and public sectors have a small number of plans, these two sectors 
together represent 44% of all superannuation investors and 32.65% of total assets. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
The governance of superannuation plans 
The agency costs of superannuation plans arise because there is no legal contractual 
relationship between the contributor and the portfolio manager who undertakes the 
investment decisions.  The separation of ownership and control creates the agency costs 
of monitoring expenses incurred by the principal; bonding expenditures of the agent; and 
residual losses borne by the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Clark and Urwin 
(2008) note that pension institutions incur greater agency costs than many corporations 
due to the existence of more than one principal, the difficulty of monitoring the plan 
administrators and trustees and, the difficulty of aligning the motivations of all agents (in 
particular the portfolio managers).  
In the Australian context, Coleman et al., (2006) state that the agency costs in the 
superannuation industry may be due to the large array of investment options offered by 
superannuation plans, inadequate and inconsistent financial disclosure, complicated tax 
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and social security effects and, information asymmetry. In the superannuation industry, 
the most common monitoring costs are the annual and semi-annual audit (Drew and 
Stanford, 2003). Bonding costs include out-of-pocket costs of structuring and 
administering contracts. The contributor may experience residual losses through the 
diminution in value of investments as the decisions of the agent may not be in the best 
interests of the principal. They rely on the trustee boards to deliver their pension in the 
long term (Clark and Monk, 2008).  
Schneider and Damanpour (2002a and 2002b) use public choice theory to explain 
the governance of public pension plans.  Public choice theory, similar to agency theory, 
asserts that managers are agents whose interests tend to conflict with those of their 
owner-principals.  Subsequently, pension plan managers will tend to act in their self-
interest, resulting in agency costs that have a negative effect on risk-adjusted plan return. 
Effective governance can reduce agency costs as it influences how ‘the objectives 
of the company are set and achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed, and how 
performance is optimised’ (Australian Securities Exchange, 2007, p. 3). There is 
evidence in the corporate sector that performance is a positive function of good 
governance (e.g. Chen, et al. 2005; Core, et al., 1999; Gompers, et al., 2003; Hutchinson 
and Gul, 2004). Similarly, Picou and Rubach (2006) show that investors react positively 
to firms that implement corporate governance guidelines. Wellman and Zhou (2005) 
demonstrate the importance of governance practices for mutual funds by testing the 
association between stewardship ratings and performance.  They find that mutual funds 
receiving good stewardship grades outperform funds with bad grades and that investors 
sell funds with poor grades and buy funds with good grades.5   
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In the context of public pension plan performance, Useem and Mitchell (2000) 
suggest a well functioning governance structure ensures oversight of operations and 
accountability of managers, which infers higher performance. They find that the 
governance of public pension plans is associated with the plan’s investment strategy, 
which, in turn, is associated with the plans financial performance.  However, they find no 
direct association between plan governance and financial performance. In contrast, 
Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) find a direct association between governance and 
financial performance (using abnormal returns as a measure of risk adjusted returns after 
controlling for investment strategy). Ambachtsheer et al. (2007) consider the state of 
global pension fund governance using a CEO self-rating survey of governance practices 
and fund performance in 1997 and 2004 and find a statistically positive association 
between governance and performance (using the pension fund’s excess return over its 
asset mix policy).  However, they suggest that there are still weaknesses in governance 
practices, such as board competency and oversight, a shortage of self-evaluation reviews 
of board effectiveness, and lack of delegation clarity.   
The international evidence would suggest that there is a positive relation between 
pension plan governance and performance, although the results are inconclusive which 
leaves uncertainty in our knowledge of superannuation (pension) governance and its 
effectiveness. In contrast to the US and UK research, there is no empirical evidence on 
the linkage between investment performance and governance practices of the 
Superannuation Industry in Australia.   
To assess the relation between superannuation governance and plan outcomes it is 
necessary to identify and measure key governance principles. Best practice 
Superannuation Fund Governance                                                                                - 10 - 
 
 
superannuation governance guidelines are published by the Association of 
Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), the Australian Council of Super Investors 
(ACSI), the Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees (AIST) and APRA.  Reports 
prepared by The Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia (ICAA) and Deloitte (2002; 
2008) and the University of Melbourne Centre for Corporate Law and Securities 
Regulation (2000) make recommendations in relation to key governance areas such as: 
the number of trustees, independent trustees, trustee meetings, remuneration, code of 
ethics, the assessment of internal controls and prudential reviews. 
Although the superannuation industry differs from the corporate sector, many of 
the superannuation governance guidelines are aligned with the corporate governance 
practices recommended by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council (2007). According to Clark and Urwin (2009), organisations 
respond to changes in the environment by (partial or incomplete) adoption of another 
type of institutions’ operating procedures.  They suggest that UK corporate governance 
practices have been adopted by pension plans due to the reputation that the UK has for its 
reform of company law and its attempts to resolve board conflicts of interest. Adopted 
corporate governance practices include the separation of the role of the Chair from the 
CEO, a notion consistent with trustee duties and professional standards of management 
and responsibility.  The selection of board trustees goes beyond merely representing 
contributors to adding skills and experience to the board.  As such, pension fund 
governance seeks to impact the composition of boards and the competence of boards’ 
decision-making through the process of recruitment and selection. A number of trustee 
boards delegate decision-making to sub-committees to enhance decisions in line with the 
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rate of change in financial markets. Consequently, pension fund governance exhibits the 
characteristics of governance models normally associated with corporate boards of 
directors (Clark and Urwin, 2009). 
From the corporate and superannuation governance literature and, by reference to 
professional body guidelines, we identify 3 key areas of recommended governance 
practice: 
(i) board composition, independence and meeting frequency,  
(ii) committees 
audit committees,  
risk management committees,  
nomination and remuneration committees,  
investment committees,  
(iii) board review of policies. 
 
The board 
   The ICAA (2002) research report on superannuation plans highlights that there is 
no one ideal board size, as entities differ in terms of size and requirements. Useem and 
Mitchell (2000), suggest that pension plans with smaller boards are expected to stress 
tactical investing and outsource asset management, resulting in higher financial 
performance.  Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) find a significant negative association 
between board size and performance, suggesting that smaller boards make better 
investment decisions. In mutual funds, Tufano and Sevick (1997) show smaller boards 
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lead to better performance, whereas Ding and Wermers (2005) show that larger boards 
are better at replacing poor performing managers, leading to better performance 
ASFA (2004) states that independence of the board of directors is necessary to 
reduce actual or perceived conflicts of interest (ASFA, 2004, p. 17).  The board of 
superannuation plans is normally independent of the portfolio managers, but may not be 
independent of the plan sponsor.  Pension fund research applies various definitions of 
board trustee independence, including the method of appointment, such as, employer-
sponsors (APRA, 2008) or governor appointed trustees (Albrecht and Hingorani, 2004) 
and independence from the plan administrator (Schneider and Damanpour, 2002).  
Coleman, et al. (2006) show that not-for-profit plans significantly outperform for-profit 
plans6 and suggest that agency costs are lower in not-for-profit plans due to 
representative trustee boards. 
The Australian Council of Super Investors (ACSI) (2005) states that board 
meetings should be held regularly to ensure that a requisite amount of time is spent 
dealing with board related matters. The Australian Securities Exchange (2007) also state 
that the board and audit committees should meet frequently enough to ensure that the 
committees perform effectively. Vafeas (1999) suggests that board-meeting frequency is 
a proxy for the time a director spends on monitoring management and he finds that 
board-meeting frequency is inversely related to firm value. However, he notes that this 
finding is driven by the fact that boards meet more frequently after crises and that 
performance increases as a result. In contrast, Evans and Weir (1995) show there is a 
positive relation between frequency of meetings and profitability.  
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Schneider and Damanpour (2002a) argue that plans with a board of trustees 
responsible for investment policies will maximise risk-adjusted returns due to their 
legally specified fiduciary duties and governance obligations. Their research finds a 
positive association between the board of trustees and plan funding (2002b). However, 
they fail to find a significant association between the board of trustees and investment 
returns (2002a). Similarly, Harper (2008) finds no association between board 
composition or characteristics and investment performance, but finds a significant 
association between board composition and both asset allocation and funding levels. 
 
Committees 
The guidelines by the APRA and ACSI suggest that there are merits in the 
delegation of specific and specialist functions of a plan to committees so that the plan, as 
a whole, can operate more effectively and efficiently. Among some of the more important 
of these committees are the audit committee, the risk management committee, the 
nomination and remuneration committee and the investment committee. However, the 
guidelines note that it is not the mere existence of these committees that is important, but 
rather the meeting frequency, committee independence and expertise that determine their 
importance.   
ASFA (2004) recommends the presence of an audit committee. Research in the 
corporate literature finds that audit committee effectiveness is associated with lowering 
the incidence of fraud (Beasley, et al., 2000; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996), 
earnings management (Bédard, et al., 2004; Klein, 2002; Peasnell, et al., 2006) and 
increasing firm performance (Erickson et al., 2005).    
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APRA (2008) suggests that it is the responsibility of the superannuation trustees 
to develop, implement, monitor and maintain a risk management strategy and a risk 
management plan. APRA (2008) also recommends that the trustees form a committee to 
oversee risk management, including compliance risk. The effectiveness of the risk 
management committee is dependent on the available resources and the independence of 
the committee. 
Although the members of board of trustees are not usually professional portfolio 
managers, they are often involved in setting the investment strategy (Useem and Mitchell, 
2000).  When the board is directly responsible for investment decisions, they pursue less 
tactical investing strategies, resulting in lower financial performance (Useem and 
Mitchell, 2000). The ICAA (2002) and APRA (2008) suggests that a superannuation plan 
and its trustees may benefit from having an independent and experienced investment sub-
committee to advise the board on profitable investments and deal with investment 
governance issues. Clark and Urwin (2008) consider the characteristics of investment 
committees using 10 top institutional funds from around the world.  They suggest that an 
effective investment committee depends on whether the members have “task-related 
competencies” for effective asset management (Clark and Urwin, 2008, p. 14).  
 
Board review of policies 
The documentation of policies to monitor governance, review conflicts of interest 
and annual reviews are recommended by ASFA (2004). The reviews should be conducted 
at least annually to ensure the effectiveness of the company’s investment and risk 
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management systems (ASX, 2007). Clark and Urwin (2008) find exemplars of 
governance in institutional pension funds annually review board member performance. 
 
Data, Sample Selection and Methods 
While agency issues potentially arise in all plan types, we focus on Public Sector and 
Industry plans.7 As highlighted previously, these categories are economically important 
in the Australian setting – they jointly represent 44% of superannuation investors and 
32% of total industry assets (see Table 1). Typically, in an industry or public sector plan, 
the trustee is a company. The board of the trustee company meets to discuss the 
management of the plan, appoints directors and has several committees. The trustee is 
supported by the plan secretariat, a small management team. The plan secretariat may 
engage portfolio managers to make the routine investment decision of the plan, but the 
responsibility for management and control of the plan remains with the trustee 
(Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, 1993).   
 The governance practices of Australian (public sector and industry) 
superannuation plans in 2005 and 20068 are examined using a survey questionnaire which 
was emailed to the trustee organisations. A preliminary list of sample trustee 
organisations and contacts was provided by a professional consulting firm. Initial contact 
was made by telephone to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Investment 
Officers (CIOs) of the superannuation plans to ascertain their interest in participating in 
the survey. The questionnaire was emailed to 34 industry and 24 public sector plans in 
mid July 2007 and follow up calls were made when necessary. Responses were received 
from 19 industry plans (54.3% response rate) and 16 public sector plans (66.67% 
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response rate). This represents 23.5% and 36.4% of the respective plans registered with 
APRA as categorised in Table 1. We note that the research is subject to the principal 
limitation encountered by survey researchers, non-response bias.  It may be that only the 
plans with good governance responded to the survey. However, there were no significant 
differences between the governance practices from the early respondents compared to 
late respondents, which may indicate minimal bias present.    
Performance and volatility of investment returns data were collected from two 
primary sources namely: Chant West Financial Services and SuperRatings.9 For two 
plans, the performance data were gathered from the plans’ Product Disclosure Statement 
(PDS) found on the plans’ websites. Benchmark returns were collected from the 
Morningstar Direct database and the risk-free rate was collected from the Centre for 
Research in Finance (CRIF) database. 
 
Questionnaire Design and Methodology 
The survey questionnaire10 is divided into six areas, developed from recommended 
governance practices identified from both the corporate and superannuation governance 
literature and by reference to professional body guidelines (as outlined earlier). 
Specifically, we survey board trustees on: (a) board composition, independence and 
meeting frequency, (b) audit committees, (c) risk management committees, (d) 
nomination and remuneration committees, (e) investment committees and, (f) board 
review of policies. 
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Section 1 of the questionnaire requests responses on the board size, independence 
and meeting frequency. We define an independent board of trustees as one that is not 
influenced by management and is consequently independent of the plan secretariat.  
The second and third sections of the questionnaire address the presence of audit 
and risk management committees. These sections are aimed at identifying the presence, 
size and frequency of meetings and the presence of an independent chairperson in the 
committees.   
In section 4 of the questionnaire we address the presence, size and frequency of 
meetings in relation to the Investment Committee. In addition, issues on the decision-
making capabilities and experience of members are identified.   
Section 5 of the questionnaire addresses the presence of the nomination and 
remuneration committee and the number and independence of the board members. The 
nomination committee is responsible for nominating the board of directors as well as 
ensuring the board has a mix of skills and expertise to maximise efficiency. The 
remuneration committee is responsible for designing, reviewing and approving 
remuneration of the directors and senior executives. The existence of a formal 
governance policy and review procedures are identified in Section 6 of the questionnaire.  
 Results from the survey are summarised and comparisons are made between the 
years 2005 and 2006 and between public sector and industry plans. The Wilcoxon test is 
used for variables with ratio data, while odds ratios are used for the nominal variables. 
 We expect public sector and industry funds to be have similar governance 
practices as they are both not-for-profit organisations. Given the increasing attention to 
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governance principals over time we anticipate some improvement in governance 
practices in the 2006 period. 
 
Relation between performance and governance practices - methodology 
The data from the survey that identify key governance variables are analysed to 
determine if governance influences performance and risk. Generally, we expect good 
governance to enhance the performance and reduce the risk/volatility of returns. More 
specifically, we expect that meeting frequency and committee existence is positively 
associated with return and negatively associated with risk, consistent with Useem and 
Mitchell (2000) and Albrecht and Hingorani (2004). Smaller board size is expected to 
improve performance and reduce risk. However, no directional predictions are made with 
regard to the linkage between frequency of conflict review and plan performance or risk. 
On the one hand, while frequent review of board activities is a principal of good 
governance (Clark and Urwin (2008), on the other the review of conflicts may indicate 
there are problems associated with the plan.  
A series of regression models are used. In the first set of regressions, we estimate 
performance as a function of board size and four dummy variables to represent the 
existence of the audit, risk management, investment and nomination/remuneration 
committees and policy review frequency. Board and committee independence are not 
included in the regressions as almost all members of the board and chairs of the 
committees are independent of the plan secretariat. We then extend the regression to 
include board meeting frequency, years of experience of the investment committee and 
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the number of times conflicts of interest are signed off. All regression models control for 
size, while the return and volatility models also control for benchmark return.11 
 Performance is measured in two ways: raw return and return in excess of the 
benchmark. Each of the variables are annual measures but lead the governance variables 
by 6 months. This lead criterion is implemented to allow for time between the adoption of 
the governance criteria and a performance outcome. Each plan has up to four return 
measures to represent their key product offerings. We identify the return on the high 
growth, growth, balanced and diversified default products.12 Annual raw returns are 
calculated as the cumulative monthly return to investors, including distributions. The 
monthly returns are net of taxes and fees. This measure is similar to raw return figures 
used in Bilson, Frino and Heaney (2004) and Frino, et al. (2005). To match the relevant 
market return to each of the high growth, growth, balanced and conservative categories, 
the Vanguard Personal Superannuation Trust Index is used as a proxy for the benchmark 
return. Excess return is measured as raw return less the benchmark return.   
The second series of regressions assess the impact of governance on fund 
volatility. The independent governance variables in these regressions are the same as the 
performance models and include controls for size and benchmark volatility. Volatility of 
returns is measured as the standard deviation of twelve monthly return observations. This 
measure is then annualised. Prior research by Coleman, et al. (2006) use a similar 
measure of volatility in ROA estimates. 
Recall that governance data are gathered on each trustee organisation while 
performance data are gathered on the products offered by these trustee organisations. A 
total of 34 trustee organisations responded to the survey over two years making a total of 
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65 survey observations (31 in 2005 and 34 in 2006). However, since each trustee 
organisation had multiple products there are 155 observations over the 2 years (2005 and 
2006) pooled for the regression. The cross-sectional regression models are estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White’s adjustment for heteroskedasticity, 
consistent standard errors and covariance. For those regression in which volatility is the 
dependent variable we also estimate the models using a Tobit regression, in recognition 
of the censored nature of these data.  
 
Results  
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics on returns for the sample, classified as industry and public sector 
plans, are presented in Panel A of Table 2. Although there is some variation in the range 
of returns between the two groups, the average return is very similar. A t-test shows there 
is no significant difference between the two groups of returns. Panel B shows mean 
returns for investments classified by style. High-growth investments have the highest raw 
return. However, once measured relative to benchmark there is little variation in return 
between groups. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Questionnaire results 
 
Table 3 shows the summary of responses to the questionnaire distributed to the public 
sector and industry plans. The questionnaire addresses six key governance issues: board 
independence, audit committees, risk management committees, investment committees, 
nomination and remuneration committees and governance policy documents. Responses 
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to each issue are shown in a separate panel.  Responses to questions addressing the board 
size, composition and activities are summarised in Panel A of Table 3. The average 
number of directors on the Board of trustees was 8.32 (8.62) in 2005 (2006) with a 
minimum of five and a maximum of 16 in any one plan. There is no significant difference 
between the size of the board for industry or public sector plans. The level of trustee 
independence is nearly 100%13.  Only 2 plans in each year had any trustee director who 
was not independent of the plan secretariat; hence, approximately 94% of plans have 
independent trustee directors. The range of meeting frequency across plans varied from 6 
to 26 in both years. The average number of meetings per year was 11.60 (2005) and 
12.32 (2006). Public sector plans have a significantly higher number of meetings, 14.2 
(14.3) compared with industry plans 9 (10.6) in 2005 (2006).14 
 Table 3, Panel B shows the responses to the questions relating to audit 
committees.  The majority of plans have an audit committee – 87% in 2005 and 91% in 
2006. The average number of people on the committee is 3.4 in 2005 and 3.6 in 2006. 
The committee meets on average 4.7 (5) times in 2005 (2006) although the range across 
varies between 3 and 11 times per year. Of those plans with an audit committee, all but 
one had an independent chairperson. There is no significant difference between the public 
sector and industry plans. 
 Responses to questions addressing the risk management committee are presented 
in Table 3, Panel C. Sixty-eight percent (65%) of plans had a risk management committee 
in 2006 (2005). Additional comments in the survey show that the audit committee also 
addressed risk management issues. Industry plans are significantly more likely to have a 
risk management committee.15 There is on average 4 people on the risk management 
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committee and the majority are independent (89% average independence in 2006). The 
number of meetings during the year range from 4 to 11 with an average of 5. 
 Panel D of Table 3 shows a summary of responses to issues relating to investment 
committees. In 2006, 73.5% of plans surveyed reported a separate investment committee 
(83% of industry plans and 62.5% of public sector plans). Seventy-nine percent of the 
members are independent of the plan secretariat in 2006 but only 22% are independent of 
the board of trustees. That is, the majority of investment committee members are also 
trustee directors. However, some investment committees have at least one member who is 
independent of both the board and the plan secretariat (33% in industry and 30% in the 
public sector). The chairperson is independent of the plan secretariat in all cases and the 
final decision on strategic investment matters remains a responsibility of the board for the 
majority of plans.  Investment committee involvement in portfolio structure and portfolio 
manager selection decisions has increased slightly from 2005 to 2006.  This level of 
decision-making is more prevalent in the industry sector investment committee than the 
public sector investment committee.  Public sector plans report significantly more years 
experience in the investment industry than industry plans, 18.4 years compared with 9.9 
years respectively.16  
 Only a small proportion of the plans have a nomination and remuneration 
committee (Table 3, Panel E) – 31% in 2006 and these committees are more prevalent in 
the industry plans. These committees do in general have members independent of the 
plan secretariat.  Responses to governance policy questions are presented in Table 3, 
Panel F. The majority of plans have a governance policy – 85% in 200617. Three plans 
reported that, although they did not have a document of governance policy, they have 
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specific provisions for conflict of interest. The average time per annum to review the 
provisions was 3 but ranged from 1 to 21 times per year. There is little difference 
between the industry and public sector plans in this area.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
In summary, the survey results show a marginal improvement in the governance 
of both industry and public sector superannuation plans from 2005 to 2006.  The results 
of the survey show that industry and public sector superannuation plans follow 
recommended governance oversight practices with the board and the audit, risk 
management and nomination and remuneration committees independent of the plan 
secretariat.  In comparison to a survey by ICAA and Deloitte (2002), our study reveals 
improvements in superannuation governance in many areas18. Therefore, along with the 
growth in plans under management in Australian superannuation plans, there appears also 
to be an increased adoption of recommended governance practices. 
 
Performance, Volatility and Superannuation Governance 
Table 4 presents the regression of various performance criteria on governance variables. 
In columns 2 and 3 the dependent variable is annual raw return, in columns 4 and 5 the 
dependent variable is excess returns, which represents the raw return less the benchmark 
return.  The volatility models are reported in columns 6 and 7 where the dependent 
variable is the annualised standard deviation of the 12 monthly returns. The sample 
period is 2005 and 2006. The independent variables are measured for each calendar year 
and the dependent variables are measured with a lead of 6 months. The results of the 
regression analysis demonstrate the relation between performance and governance 
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practices. The results show that, where performance is measured using return and excess 
return, board size and review of conflicts are positively related to investment 
performance at the 5% and 10% levels of significant respectively. This result is 
inconsistent with expectations; however, the board size result is consistent with the 
research by Cheng (2008) who finds that firms with larger boards have lower variability 
in corporate performance. Further, the positive association between board size and 
investment performance is consistent with resource dependency theory that suggests that 
board size may be a measure of an organization's ability to form environmental links to 
secure critical resources (Goodstein, et al., 1994).   
There is a marginally significant negative association (at the 10% level of 
significance) between performance, measured as raw return, and the existence of an 
investment committee and investment committee experience respectively. This results is 
also inconsistent with expectations. However, it is possible agency costs are higher for 
plans with a separate investment committees and this result may reflect the lack of 
independence of the investment committee from the board of trustees found in the survey 
responses. Even though investment committee members are mainly independent of the 
plan secretariat, the majority of the investment committee members are also directors on 
the board of trustees. Further analysis of the questionnaire responses shows that in the 
majority of cases, even when plans have a separate investment committee, the board has 
the final say in decisions relating to strategic investment matters, portfolio structure and 
portfolio manager selection (see Table 3 Panel D). These findings are consistent with 
research on U.S. pension plans that show a negative association between board decisions 
on asset allocation and performance (Albrecht al., 2007; Useem and Mitchell, 2002). 
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Whilst not statistically significant, the economic relationship between investment 
committees and volatility is negative. This suggests that investment committees do help 
to lower risk, but not significantly so, which is commensurate with findings for lower 
return19.  Consequently, the composition of the investment committee may be determined 
by a variety of agendas that may not provide the specialised skills required to operate 
effectively (Clark and Urwin, 2008). The implication of this result is that plans may be 
better advised to outsource their investment decisions to independent portfolio managers.  
Alternatively, the results could reflect that poor performing plans establish an investment 
committee in an attempt to improve current performance.  The frequency of conflict 
reviews has a positive and significant (at the 10% level) impact on performance. Hence, 
meeting to quickly address conflicts is important to performance outcomes. However, it 
is noted that there is no impact of this variable on the risk of the plan. The result is 
consistent with the view that by addressing conflicts, the risk profile of the plan is 
maintained yet performance is marginally improved. 
Where the dependent variable is volatility the only significant relation is with 
board meeting frequency.20 The coefficient is positive showing that the more meetings 
the higher the volatility. This result is consistent with boards meeting in response to high 
impact issues. It is likely that plans undergoing higher than expected volatility of returns 
will meet more frequently.  The result is also consistent with research by Vafeas (1999) 
who finds that the number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value.  Board 
activity increases after share price falls, however.  The negative association between 
meeting frequency and performance may also reflect the additional costs associated with 
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board meetings, including managerial time, travel expenses, and directors' meeting fees 
(Vafeas, 1999). 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Sensitivity analysis 
The regression analyses were repeated using the Sharpe measure as the dependant 
variable. In this instance, there were no significant coefficients. Hence, although there is 
some impact of plan governance on return measures it does not follow through to risk 
adjusted returns. For robustness, the potential relations between risk adjusted 
performance and governance matters are further investigated by comparing top and 
bottom performers. Plans are classified into two groups on the basis of above and below 
median performance and the groups are compared in terms of the key governance 
variables.21 The only significant difference is with respect to the investment committee. 
Thirty-eight (11) of the bottom (top) performing plans have an investment committee. 
The difference between the bottom and top groups is significant at the 1% level. This 
result is consistent with the result using return performance and supports the concept that 
poor performing plans establish an investment committee to improve performance.  
 
Conclusion 
Corporate collapses typically result in the emphasis being placed on individual’s 
unethical conduct, such as the CEO, as the cause of financial mismanagement.  However, 
this approach often fails to acknowledge the responsibility of the organisation as a whole, 
and the series of management and systems failures, which created the circumstances in 
which the abuse could take place (Drennan, 2004).  The responsibility for ensuring that 
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all business risks are effectively addressed lies with the board of directors, both 
individually and collectively. The impetus for ethical business comes from the tone at 
top. In the context of superannuation plans, it is the board of trustees who creates the 
culture within a plan. Consequently, the research presented in this paper highlights the 
role and responsibilities of the board of trustees. 
The objectives of the study are twofold.  First, we document the governance 
practices of superannuation plans and, second, we determine whether these practices have 
an impact on financial outcomes.  The results of this study show that the majority of the 
superannuation plans in the industry and public sector adopt the governance practices 
recommended by APRA, ASFA and ASX in their best practices guidelines. Thus 
demonstrating support for the concept of ethical management of the member’s retirement 
savings.  Using return and excess return as the measure of performance, the governance 
practices positively related to financial performance are the size of the board of trustees 
and the frequency of conflict review.  Interestingly, although only marginally significant, 
the existence of an investment committee and investment committee expertise is 
negatively associated with financial performance.  This result concurs with U.S. research 
that finds a negative association between board purview of investment decisions and 
performance (Albrecht, et al., 2007) suggesting that governance is a reaction mechanism 
to poor performance. Finally the results show a significant association between the 
frequency of board meetings and volatility of returns, which infers that volatile plans 
meet more frequently. 
Limitations of the study relate to the depth of analysis of superannuation 
governance practices and suggest areas for further research.  Future research could 
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benefit by investigating the trustees’ investment decision processes, the way portfolios 
are constructed to attain the best return, and whether that construction is related to the 
governance practices of the superannuation plan.   Although our research identified the 
existence of separate investment committees, the reality was that in most instances, the 
members of the investment committee were also members of the board of trustees.  
Therefore, it would be useful to have an indication of trustees’ training in investment 
decisions.  A further issue for future research is whether the board of trustees have 
invested their personal superannuation in their own fund, which creates incentives to 
improve investment performance. This information may improve the explanatory power 
of the governance variables. 
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Table 1 
Classification of Australian Superannuation Plans 
  
Panel A: Number of Entities   
 Number 
Percentage
(excl small)
Corporate 555 55.78%
Industry 81 8.14%
Public sector 44 4.42%
Retail (including ERF and PST) 315 31.66%
Subtotal 995 
Small 326,641 
Total 327,513 
Panel B: Members per Entity  
 
Number 
(millions) 
Percentage
(excl small)
Corporate 0.6 2.06%
Industry 10 34.36%
Public sector 2.9 9.97%
Retail (including ERF and PST) 15.0 51.55%
Subtotal 29  
Small 0.6 2.06%
Total 29.1  
Panel C: Total assets   
 ($ billion) 
Percentage
(excl small)
Corporate 52.4 5.65%
Industry 150.5 16.24%
Public sector 152 16.4%
Retail (including ERF and PST) 357.4 38.56%
Subtotal 712  
Small 214.8 23.18%
Total 926.8 
Source:  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) website: http://www.apra.gov.au/Statistics/Annual-Superannuation-
Publication.cfm  
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A   
 Annual Return Excess Return 
 Mean (Std Dev) Min Max Mean (Std Dev) 
Public Sector Plans 0.142 (0.04) 0.055 0.237 0.012 (0.02) 
Industry Plans 0.143 (0.04) 0.072 0.25 0.009 (0.024) 
 
 
 
 
Panel B  
Mean (Standard Deviation)  
 
Annual Return  
Excess Annual 
Return  Sharpe ratio Size ($ millions) 
Benchmark 
Annual  Mean 
Return 
High Growth 0.18 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 8.45 (3.2) 5000 (6798) 0.19 
Growth 0.16 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 8.88 (3.62) 3623 (4137) 0.15 
Balanced  0.14 (0.02) 0.02 ( 0.02) 9.05 (2.59) 4607 (6532) 0.12 
Conservative  0.09 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 6.69 (3.83) 4844 (6169)  0.08 
 
  
Superannuation Fund Governance                                                                                - 31 - 
 
 
 
Table 3  
Survey Results 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
  2005 2006 2005   2006   
  All Plans   industry public industry public 
Total Number of Plans 31 34 15 16 18 16 
Number of Directors on the Board of Trustees:        
     Average 8.32 8.62 9.13 7.6 9.56 7.56
     Minimum 5 5 6 5 6 5 
     Maximum 16 16 16 12 16 12 
Number of plans with trustees independent of the plan secretariat 29 32 14 15 17 15 
Number of plans with a chairperson independent of the plan secretariat 29 (94%) 33 (94%) 13 16 17 16 
Number of meetings per year of the Trustee Board:        
     Average 11.6 12.32 9 14.2 10.61 14.25
     Minimum 6 6 6 6 6 6 
     Maximum 26 26 16 26 24 26 
       
Panel B:  Audit Committee       
  2005 2006 2005   2006   
  All Funds   industry public industry public 
Total Number of Plans 31 34 15 16 18 16 
Number of Plans that have an Audit committee 27 (87%) 31 (91%) 14 (93.3%) 13 (81.2%) 17 (94.4%) 14 (87.5%) 
Number of people are on the committee across plans:        
     Average 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.9 4 3.9 
     Minimum 2 2 2 3 2 3 
     Maximum 7 7 7 6 7 6 
Number of plans with one or more committee members independent of the plan secretariat 21 22 12 9 13 9 
Average percentage of independent members 94% 93% 96% 92% 93% 92% 
Number of plans  with an independent chairperson 26 30 14 12 17 13 
Number of committee meetings per year:        
     Average 4.7 5 5 5.8 5.7 5.2 
     Minimum 3 3 3 4 3 0 
     Maximum 11 11 9 11 9 11 
       
Panel C:  Risk Management Committee       
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  2005 2006 2005   2006   
  All Plans   industry public industry public 
Total Number of Plans 31 34 15 16 18 16 
Number of Plans (percentage) that have a Risk Management committee (%) 20 (65%) 23 (67.6%) 11 9 13 10 
Number of people on the committee across plans:        
     Average 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.7 4.2 4 
     Minimum 2 2 2 3 2 3 
     Maximum 7 7 7 7 7 6 
Number of plans with one or more committee members independent of the plan secretariat 15 16 8 7 9 7 
Average percentage of independent members 90% 89% 85% 95% 85% 93% 
Number of plans (percentage) with an independent chairperson 19 (95%) 22 (96%) 11 (100%) 8 (89%) 13 (100%) 9 (90%) 
Number of committee meetings per year:        
     Average 5.2 5.3 4.2 6.3 5.2 2.2 
     Minimum 3 4 3 4 3 4 
     Maximum 11 11 8 11 8 11 
       
Panel D:  Investment Committee       
  2005 2006 2005   2006   
  All Plans   industry public industry public 
Total Number of Plans 31 34 15 16 18 16 
Number of Plans that have an investment committee (%) 22 (71%) 25 (73.5%) 13 (86.7%) 9 (56%) 15(83%) 10(62.5%) 
Number of people on the committee across plans:        
     Average 5.9 5.6 6.3 4.7 6.6 4.9
     Minimum 3 3 3 4 3 4 
     Maximum 12 12 12 6 12 7 
Number of plans with one or more independent committee members 8 8 4 4 5 3 
Average percentage of committee members that are independent of the Board 20% 22% 18% 28% 17% 24% 
Average percentage of committee members that are independent of the plan secretariat 90% 89.8% 89% 91.6% 88.8% 91% 
Number of plans with an independent chairperson 22 24 12 10 14 10 
Number of plans where the investment committee makes the final decision on:        
strategic investment matters (e.g. asset allocation) 4 4  3 1 3 1 
portfolio structure  10 13 7 3 10 3 
selecting portfolio managers. 10 14  8 2 11 3 
Years experience of the committee in the investment industry:        
     Average 12.9 13.25 8.7 18.3 9.9 18.4 
     Maximum 30 30 18 30 25 30 
    Minimum 3 3 3 15 3 15 
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Panel E:  Remuneration Committee       
  2005 2006 2005   2006   
  All Plans   industry public industry public 
Total Number of Plans 31 34 15 16 18 16 
Number of Plans that have a Remuneration committee (%) 11 (36%) 14 (41%) 8 (53%) 3 (19%) 9 (50%) 5 (31%) 
Number of people on the committee across plans:        
     Average 3 3 3.1 3 3.3 3.2 
     Minimum 2 2 2 3 2 2 
     Maximum 5 5 5 3 5 4 
Number of plans with one or more committee members independent of the plan secretariat 10 12 8 2 8 4 
Average percentage of independent members 97% 97% 100% 89% 98% 95% 
        
        
Panel F: Corporate Governance Policy        
  2005 2006 2005   2006   
  All Plans   industry public industry public 
Total Number of Plans 31 34 15 16 18 16 
Number of plans with a document of its governance policy 26 (84%) 29 (85%) 13 13 16 13 
Number of plans with specific provisions for conflict of interest 28 (90%) 31 (91%) 14 14 17 14 
Time to review the conflict of interest provisions:        
     Average 3 3.3 2.5 3.5 2.8 3.8 
     Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 
     Maximum 18 21 11 18 11 21
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Table 4  
The relation between governance and performance measures.   
 
 
 Dependent variable 
Independent Variables 
Return 
 
Return 
 Excess returns Excess returns 
Volatilitya
 
Volatilitya
 
Constant -0.0161 0.0262 0.0077 0.0028 0.0116 0.0124 
 (0.32) (0.42) (0.83) (0.94) (0.50) (0.46) 
Board Size 0.0014** 0.0017** 0.0018*** 0.0019*** 0.0002 0.0004 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.54) (0.16) 
Meeting Frequency  0.0003  0.0003  0.0006*** 
  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.00) 
Audit Committee -0.0074 -0.0027 -0.0066 -0.0025 -0.0011 0.0009 
 (0.33) (0.72) (0.42) (0.76) (0.70) (0.76) 
Risk Management Committee 0.0013 0.0007 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.77) (0.88) (0.83) (0.93) (0.97) (0.98) 
Investment Committee -0.0070*  -0.0066  -0.0028  
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.19)  
Investment Committee experience  -0.0005*  -0.0004  -0.0001 
  (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.62) 
Nomination and Remuneration committee 0.0049 0.0045 0.0039 0.0034 0.0026 0.0013 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.35) (0.43) (0.18) (0.52) 
Frequency of conflict reviews 0.0008* 0.0009* 0.0008* 0.0009* 0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.95) (0.49) 
Size -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0011 
 (0.91) (0.84) (0.86) (0.77) (0.52) (0.19) 
Benchmark Return (Risk col 5) 0.8175*** 0.8131***   0.9818*** 0.9879*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.69 0.03 0.03 0.7800 0.7800 
 
***Significant at 1% level, **5% and *10% levels of significance.  a The results are consistent using a Tobit model of estimation. The independent variables are determined from the 
questionnaire:  Board size – the number of directors on the board; Meeting frequency – the number of times the board meets in 1 calendar year; audit committee = 1 if the plan has an 
audit committee, 0 otherwise; Risk Management Committee = 1 if the plan has a committee, 0 otherwise; Investment committee = 1 if the plan has a committee, 0 otherwise; 
Investment Committee experience is the average number of years experience across all members of the committee; Nomination and Remuneration committee = 1 if the plan has a 
committee, 0 otherwise; Frequency of conflict review is the number of times per year the board meets to review conflicts of interest. 
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1 The statistics presented are based on 31st December 2006 and 31st March 2007 data.  
2 Ninety per cent of Australians believe superannuation funds’ role is to protect members’ savings (CPA Australia, 
2006). 
3 Corporate funds are sponsored by a single employer or a group of related employers. Retail funds are ‘public offer’ 
funds operated by profit making bodies. These funds are available to the general public through intermediaries such 
as financial institutions, life insurance agents or financial planners. 
4 Australian Government, Superannuation Choice Act No. 82 (2005) provides employees with the right to choose 
their preferred superannuation fund. 
5 They use Morningstar Stewardship Grades from the Morningstar Direct database. 
6 Performance is measured over a seven year period to June 2002 
7 Limited access to data on corporate and small plans restricts the inclusion of these plans in the study. We exclude 
retail plans to minimise inconsistencies in the role of the trustee and the operation of the plan secretariat. Moreover, 
the profit motive of retail plans potentially introduces agency issues beyond those of the public sector and industry 
plans. 
8 The study is limited by the short time series; however, given the governance data could only be obtained by 
questionnaire it was not feasible to request historical data from the managers. 
9 Chant West and SuperRatings are specialist superannuation research and consultancy firms. 
10 A copy of the survey is available from the authors on request. 
11 Size may influence the performance of a fund; although, it is noted that the evidence on the impact of fund size is 
inconclusive. Berk and Green (2004) state that as funds increase in size, there are decreasing returns to scale; hence, 
larger funds statistically have lower returns. Chen et al. (2004) suggest that, for corporations, a large asset base can 
erode fund performance primarily because of the costs associated with liquidity. However Indro, et al. (1999) state 
that mutual funds must attain a minimum fund size to achieve sufficient returns to justify the costs of acquiring and 
trading on information,.  
12 The growth asset ratios of each category are:  high growth - above 90%: growth - between 77% and 90%; 
balanced - between 60% and 76% and conservative - less than 60%. 
13 Board independence is the proportion of trustee directors who are not executives of the fund secretariat. 
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14 The Wilcoxon test statistic is 2.67 (1.88) in 2005 (2006), significant at the 1% (10%) level. APRA (2008) reports 
similar results; the average number of board meetings for the public sector is 9.1 and 7.5 for industry funds. 
15 Comparison using the odds ratio results in values of 2.13 in 2005 and 1.56 in 2006. 
16 The Wilcoxon test statistic for the difference between the 2 groups is 2.44 in 2005 and 21.6 in 2006. These 
statistics are significant at the 0.05 level of significance. 
17 Most funds have formal policies on governance, particularly in relation to reviewing compliance with the SIS Act 
and other regulations. 
18 The data collection for the ICAA and Deloitte survey encompassed a written self-completed survey sent to 303 of 
Australia's Top Superannuation Funds and Master Trusts of which 69 responded.  Some key results from the ICAA 
and Deloitte report (our study) are: mean number of trustees: 7.41 (8.26); percentage of independent directors: 45% 
(98%); trustee meeting frequency: 6.88 (11.42) times and; presence of independent chairperson: 33% (98%)  
19 Thanks to the reviewer for this insight. 
20 Results are robust to a Tobit estimation. 
21 Results are not reported but available from the authors on request. 
